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INTRODUCTION
Millions of divorced couples are regulated in their conduct as parents by
the terms of parenting plans or custody and visitation orders established by the
divorce courts.  These judicial orders restrict certain parental choices, such as
the amount of time that each parent will spend with the children and the
manner in which important child-related decisions will be made.  Prior to
divorce, these same families were free of such detailed regulation by the state.
In the eyes of the law, the post-divorce regulation of parenting activity serves
the important purpose of protecting, in an orderly fashion, established
relationships between children and both of their parents in light of the changed
family circumstances that result from divorce.
Judicial orders allocating parental rights and responsibilities following
divorce are mandatory in nature, requiring both parents to engage in certain
types of conduct and to refrain from others.  For example, a parent may be
required to deliver the children to the physical custody of the other parent at
specified times and in a specified manner.  In another familiar example, one
parent may be required to refrain from interfering in the children’s medical
care or education, if these areas of legal custody have been assigned to the
other parent.
Although the terminology of “injunctive court orders” is not often used
in the field of child custody law, the child-related orders of the divorce court
are, indeed, injunctive in nature.  They are typical of the judicial orders
historically entered by the courts acting in equity, directing one party in a
lawsuit to act in a specified way in order to vindicate the legal rights of the
other party.  Furthermore, in the event of noncompliance by the party directed
to act, custody orders are enforceable by the remedies generally associated
with “equitable,” “injunctive,” or “coercive” court orders.  Most notably, a
parent who fails to comply with the terms of a court-ordered parenting plan
is subject to the remedies of civil and criminal contempt, which may result in
the imposition of a fine or jail sentence by the court.
This Article evaluates the nature of custody and visitation orders as
coercive court orders, and their enforcement via civil and criminal contempt
remedies.  Studied against the backdrop of the law of injunctions, certain
aspects of custody law illustrate nicely the general features of injunctive
remedies doctrine.  For example, the substantive and procedural confusion
involved in distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt, which plagues
the enforcement of injunctive orders in other fields such as torts and contracts,
routinely complicates the enforcement of court-ordered parenting plans.  Other
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examples of commonality involve the operation of both private interests and
public interests (the vindication of judicial authority), and the scope of judicial
discretion.
Other dominant features of custody orders and their enforcement,
however, are not consistent with the general definition and operation of
injunctive remedies.  First, injunctive or coercive court orders typically
operate as a remedy for past unlawful activity.  In a familiar example, the
party to a contract may be ordered to specifically perform contract duties, only
after the court determines that a past breach of the contract has occurred.  By
way of contrast, in the divorce context, the court enters coercive parenting
orders absent any determination that either parent has engaged in past
unlawful conduct.  Both the order of specific performance in the contract case
and the custody order in the divorce case become enforceable by contempt, in
the event of subsequent noncompliance.
A second aspect of custody orders also sets them apart from the general
model of the injunctive or coercive court order.  Namely, in many other fields,
the courts have discretion in deciding whether to impose injunctive relief or
another form of relief (often monetary damages).  Several factors influence the
selection of remedy; for example, injunctions are less likely to be entered if
the court anticipates a long or difficult period of judicial supervision over the
party enjoined.  By way of contrast, the divorce courts are required, with rare
exception, to enter custody orders designed to regulate the conduct of parents
over a period of years, even in cases where parental conflict in the past
suggests that compliance problems may arise in the future.
Like the routine entry of coercive custody orders absent prior
wrongdoing, this additional variation from the dominant model of the
injunction reflects the compelling nature of the family interests regulated in
the post-divorce custody and visitation context.
Part I of this Article explores the nature of custody and visitation orders
as coercive judicial orders mandating specified post-divorce conduct by
parents.  The discussion explores the history of custody jurisdiction in the
equity courts prior to the merger of law and equity, and the continuing
characterization of custody law as a field where the courts exert direct
authority over individuals.  This Part also discusses the aspects of custody
orders that are distinct from other injunctive or coercive orders, and the
significance of these differences.
Part II focuses on the enforcement of court-ordered parenting plans,
especially via the remedies of civil and criminal contempt.  A close analysis
of selected custody contempt cases reveals the ways in which classic contempt
remedies have been applied and sometimes reshaped to fit the special
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1. See SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS ch. 5 (1992) (describing
parental responsibility for the financial support, education, and medical care of children); id. ch. 6
(describing parental authority to discipline children); id. ch. 9[I] (describing tort doctrines that protect the
parent-child relationship).
2. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (discussing constitutional protection for parental
rights in the context of grandparent visitation); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 13.4, at 612 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing protection for parents under the Due Process Clause in
settings where the state seeks to involuntarily terminate parental rights).
3. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(1)(C) (Supp. 2004) (“The Legislature finds
and declares that it is the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage . . . .”); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.02 cmts. b, e (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (describing “child’s best interests,” “[f]airness to the
parents,” and “[c]ontinuity of existing parent-child attachments” as the primary goals of regulation at the
time of divorce).
enforcement requirements in this field.  The flexible formulation of contempt
sanctions in these enforcement cases, like the ready availability of coercive
orders at the time of divorce, involves significant adjustments to traditional
remedies doctrines.
The law of injunctions and contempt remedies are key features of custody
and visitation law.  As described in this Article, traditional doctrines
governing the entry and enforcement of coercive judicial orders have been
adjusted in significant ways in order to address the public and private interests
involved in the post-divorce family.
PART I:  THE NATURE OF PARENTING PLAN ORDERS
A.  Custody Orders Protect Parent-Child Relationships
In the eyes of the law, the relationships established between parents and
their minor children are a key element in the maintenance of successful
families and communities, entitled to legal recognition and protection.
Various legal doctrines reflect the view that children’s interests are well-
served by the maintenance of strong ties to the parents who provide support
and guidance to them.   Furthermore, the parent’s interest in this important1
relationship has been characterized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental
right in the constitutional sense.2
The state’s support for parent-child relationships and the constitutional
importance assigned to parenting do not lose their force in the event of divorce
between married parents.   In these circumstances, the divorce courts are3
authorized by state law to issue orders for the purpose of protecting
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4. 3 ARNOLD H. RUTKIN, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 32.09[1], at 32-263 (2006).  See also ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.11 (describing circumstances in which courts may deny post-divorce
custodial responsibility to a parent).
5. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(a) (Supp. 2005) (“A parent is entitled to reasonable
parenting time unless the court finds, after a hearing, that the exercise of parenting time would seriously
endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”) (emphasis added); JOHN DE WITT
GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 11.05[A] (3d ed. 2005); 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4,
§ 32.09[2].
6. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 154 (2005) (“Although,
technically, courts have the residual power to disapprove divorce-related agreements, private settlements
are routinely approved by the courts in uncontested divorces.”); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ch. 1, at 5
(“Although a high percentage of custody arrangements are settled by agreement of the parents, under most
states’ laws a court must review an agreement to determine whether it is in the child’s best interests. . . .
Despite the appearance of review, however, independent judicial inquiry is difficult because of the
inaccessibility of facts that might dictate a different result.”) (citations omitted).
7. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:  Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 267 n.189.
8. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-9-206(a), -207(a) (LexisNexis 2004) (establishing the
standards to be employed by the court in setting custody terms “[u]nless otherwise resolved by agreement
of the parents”); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ch. 1, at 6 (“When the parents do not agree on a joint
[parenting] plan, the court must formulate one, applying the criteria set forth in the [ALI provisions
establishing standards for allocating custodial responsibilities].”).
established family relationships.  In the context of divorce, where children
have resided with both of their parents in the past, a strong presumption exists
that the court’s orders will recognize and protect the children’s future
relationships with both parents.  Thus, “[c]ourts have recognized authorities
that say the child has a right to know, love, and respect both parents and to
receive guidance and love from both. . . . If both parents are fit, usually a
child’s best interests are served through continuing contact with both
parents.”   This result in the post-divorce family also protects the relational4
interests of parents vis-à-vis their children.5
The terms of a post-divorce custody arrangement or parenting plan may
be set by the parents themselves, subject to court approval.   Many divorcing6
couples take advantage of this settlement option.   Absent such an agreement7
between the parents, the divorce court sets the terms, by reference to general
standards established by state law.   In either case, the court ultimately issues8
orders describing a parenting plan designed to serve the interests of the
children following their parents’ divorce.
B.  The Residential and Decisionmaking Provisions of Custody Orders
Court-ordered parenting plans must address two key issues.  First, the
physical or residential custody part of the order must state where the children
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9. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 19.2, at 790
(2d ed. 1988); 2 SANDRA MORGAN LITTLE, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 10.03[3][b], at 10-23 (2006).
10. CLARK, supra note 9, § 19.2, at 789-90; 2 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 10.03[3][b], at 10-21. 
11. See generally GUGGENHEIM, supra note 6, at 148-50 (summarizing the evolving role of joint
custody provisions in state custody laws in recent decades).
12. See Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the
Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 351-56 (2005).
13. Critics point out that the traditional terms “custody” and “visitation” tend to limit the ways in
which post-divorce parenting can be conceptualized.  The drafters of the Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution expressed this concern and proposed alternative terminology, as follows:
These traditional terms represent, and help to perpetuate, an adversarial, win-lose paradigm of
divorce. . . . [The ALI] uses “custodial responsibility” to encompass all forms of custody and
visitation.  The more inclusive terminology expresses the ordinary expectation that both parents
have meaningful responsibilities for their child at divorce; it leaves open the question of what
those responsibilities will be.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ch. 1, at 7.  Another alternative to the traditional terminology of “custody”
and “visitation” employs the general label “parenting plan” to cover the court-defined rights and duties of
parents.  The legislatures in certain states have rewritten their statutes in response to criticism of the
traditional terminology in this field.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(a) (Supp. 2005).  The majority
of state statutes continue to use the terms “custody” and “visitation.”
will reside, and the periods of time they will spend with each parent.   And9
second, the legal custody or decision making part of the order must detail the
authority of one or both parents over important areas of future decision
making, such as medical care and education, for the children.10
Decision making authority as to particular topics affecting children in the
future can be assigned to one parent or to both simultaneously.  The term
“joint legal custody” typically contemplates shared decision making authority
by the parents regarding some or all areas of future care for the children.11
While divorced parents can share authority in this manner for future
decisions regarding the children, they generally cannot share the same periods
of physical custody.  Various models exist for the allocation of physical
custody,  and a divorce decree typically spells out the time to be spent by the12
children with each parent.  In cases where one parent is assigned the
responsibility of serving as the primary residential custodian, so-called
“visitation orders” of the court establish the times of access for the other
parent.13
The West Virginia statutes governing post-divorce parenting
arrangements reflect the features described above:  the ability of parents to
formulate their own plan, the need to address both residential and decision
making issues for the children, and the court’s role in protecting the interests
of the children.  Thus, a provision titled “Allocation of significant decision-
making responsibility” states that “[u]nless otherwise resolved by agreement
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14. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-207(a) (LexisNexis 2004).
15. Id. § 48-9-206(a).  Notably, the West Virginia legislation sets out two different standards to
govern judicial decision making about the dual aspects of custody.  Thus, the provision regarding legal
custody establishes the best interests of the child standard, which is the standard most frequently employed
in custody cases nationwide.  Under this standard, the court has wide discretion in deciding which facts and
circumstances in each case are most important in formulating a custody order.  By way of contrast, the
approximation standard established in the West Virginia residential custody provision leaves less discretion
to the judge, because information about the role of each parent as caregiver prior to divorce must be given
the greatest weight.  This enactment follows the model proposed in the American Law Institute’s Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution, see ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08, and does not represent the
majority rule in the United States.  Many state custody laws employ a less directive standard, often
requiring the judge to allocate physical as well as legal custody according to the discretionary best interests
of the child standard.  See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 5, § 11.03[A].
of the parents . . . , the court shall allocate responsibility for making
significant life decisions on behalf of the child, including the child’s education
and health care, to one parent or to two parents jointly, in accordance with the
child’s best interest . . . .”   An additional provision addresses the14
“[a]llocation of custodial responsibility” as follows:  “Unless otherwise
resolved by agreement of the parents . . . or unless manifestly harmful to the
child, the court shall allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of
custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion
of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior
to the parents’ separation . . . .”15
C.  The Coercive Nature of Custody Orders
Court orders relating to the residential and decision making aspects of
post-divorce parenting are coercive in nature, designed to govern the conduct
of family members for the period of years between the parents’ divorce and
the children’s ages of majority.  Residential and legal custody orders require
the parents to act or not act in certain ways.
The residential terms of a typical custody order describe when the
children will spend time with each parent, and how the periodic transfer of
physical custody will be accomplished.  Each parent has affirmative duties,
then, to release the children into the care of the other at the times and in the
manner described in the custody order.
For example, if the parenting plan provides that children will reside with
their mother during the week and their father on weekends, the mother would
be in noncompliance if, without obtaining a prior modification of the plan, she
took the children on vacation for a full week and failed to return them to the
father for the weekend.  Conversely, the father’s conduct would be unlawful
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16. See, e.g., Funk v. Macaulay, 457 N.E.2d 223, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding trial court
contempt judgment based on a general finding that “the defendant . . . is interfering with and interrupting
the care, custody, and guidance of the plaintiff with respect to the minor children[,]” and the more specific
finding “that the defendant has counseled and encouraged [the] minor child of the parties not to attend
school and that such conduct has interfered and prevented the plaintiff from requiring said minor child to
attend school”).
17. See Jeffrey L. Hall, Secondhand Smoke as an Issue in Child Custody/Visitation Disputes, 97
W. VA. L. REV. 115 (1994).
18. The parent who spends less residential time with the children is more likely to find himself or
herself subject to restrictions of this nature.  See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 5, § 11.05[B] (discussing
“restrictions on visitation”).
19. Ryder v. Ryder, No. 2001CA00190, 2002 WL 258218 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002).
if he failed to return the children to the care of their mother at the end of a
weekend period.  Each of these scenarios involves a failure by the
noncompliant parent to take affirmative actions required by the initial custody
order.
The legal or decision making aspects of a parenting plan similarly create
mandates regarding post-divorce parenting conduct.  Often these orders
require one parent to refrain from taking certain actions with respect to the
children.  When sole legal custody is assigned by the court to one parent, an
enforceable obligation is imposed upon the other not to interfere with the
custodian’s authority.   For example, if the parent with sole authority16
regarding medical care decides against a child’s elective tonsillectomy, the
other parent is obligated to abide by this decision, even if he or she believes
that the procedure would be beneficial.  If the noncustodial parent takes the
child to a hospital for the surgery during a period of scheduled visitation, he
or she would be in noncompliance with the custody order.
Divorce decrees may seek to govern additional aspects of post-divorce
parenting, beyond the major aspects of residential and decision making
custody.  Additional regulations may be included because they appear in a
parenting plan agreement, or because the divorce court believes that they
would serve the children’s interests.  One category of regulations involves
conduct of the parents that would take place in the presence of the children
ranging from smoking cigarettes  to spending time with a new romantic17
partner.   A second category of court orders requires cooperative or respectful18
behavior between the parents.  For example, the custody order in the case of
Ryder v. Ryder  included the following provisions:19
The parties shall cooperate with each other and communicate with each other in regards
to their minor child . . . . The parties shall attempt to resolve their differences without
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20. Id. at *1.
21. Id. at *1-2 (noting that the trial court’s finding about mother’s failure to communicate with
father was based upon his “testi[mony] that he was never notified that [the mother] was not going to allow
[the son] to come . . . for the December visit and he . . . waited for them to arrive at the scheduled time”).
22. Within this dual system, different rules governed the subject matter, procedure, and enforcement
of court orders in law and in equity.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 26-27
(2d ed. 1985) (describing the evolution of law and equity systems in England, and their adoption in the
United States).
23. CLARK, supra note 9, § 19.1, at 786.  For an extensive treatment of the historical development
of custody law in England, see Danaya C. Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody:  A History of the Birth of
Family Law in England, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, The Crisis].
According to Professor Wright, the law courts and the Chancellor initially shared jurisdiction in matters
involving the custody of children.  Then, “[b]y the mid-eighteenth century the justices of the [law courts]
unnecessary court involvement, and each shall make an effort to be flexible when able
for the sake, benefit and best interests of the minor child . . . .20
All of these custody provisions are enforceable by the court.  If one parent
believes that the other parent has violated the residential, decision making or
other provisions of their post-divorce parenting plan, he or she may initiate an
enforcement proceeding.  The court then will hold a hearing to determine
whether the other parent in fact violated the earlier court orders and, if so, the
appropriate remedy.  In the Ryder case, for example, the mother was held in
contempt of court for violating the custody order requiring the parents to
“communicate with each other.”21
The regulation of post-divorce parenting conduct in this fashion can be
experienced by parents as a serious interference with their autonomy.  This
intrusion by the state, in the form of enforceable judicial mandates about
future conduct, is intended to accomplish the goal of supporting the
relationships between children and both of their parents following divorce.
D.  Custody Law in Historical Context
The historical background of child custody law sheds light on the
coercive nature of parenting plan and child custody and visitation orders in the
modern family law context.  The law of child custody is a survivor of the
equity system of jurisprudence, which first arose in the Chancellor’s court in
England and developed over the centuries alongside the courts of law in
England and the United States.   Professor Homer Clark traced the power of22
courts in equity to act for the welfare of children back to the seventeenth
century, and attributed the equitable character of such actions “to the range
and flexibility of remedy available in equity.”23
844 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:835
uniformly attributed to the Chancellor the jurisdiction to oversee matters regarding infants by delegation
of the crown’s parens patriae powers.”  Id. at 189.  Notably, the first reported interspousal custody case
did not appear until 1804.  See Danaya C. Wright, De Manneville v. De Manneville:  Rethinking the Birth
of Custody Law under Patriarchy, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 247 (1999).  Earlier cases typically involved the
child’s father and a nonparent as parties.  See Wright, The Crisis, supra, at 182-88.  In 1857, Parliament
created a unified family court in England with jurisdiction over the issues arising in divorce cases, including
custody.  Id. at 178.
24. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1, at 5 (2d ed. abridged 1993).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1.4, at 13.
27. See id. § 1.2.
Generally speaking, in the era described by Professor Clark, the courts of
law adjudicated specific rights and liabilities of litigating parties, and their
orders were enforceable in a subsequent action by the prevailing party against
the money or property of the other.   By way of contrast, judgments made by24
courts in equity about the litigants’ respective rights typically resulted in an
order requiring the losing party to perform a specified act.  The judicial
enforcement of such equitable orders focused on the person of the defendant,
rather than his or her property.   A key enforcement device in equity was the25
contempt power of the court directed against the individual who defied the
court’s initial order, for which the sanctions of a monetary fine and
imprisonment could be imposed.  Professor Dan Dobbs highlighted the crucial
differences between the two systems of justice, as follows:
In the old separate court system, law courts adjudicated rights and liabilities but they
issued no commands.  Instead they preferred to enforce judgments in rem.  The old
separate equity courts worked the other way around.  Their decrees ended in a personal
command telling the defendant to do something or to cease doing something. . . . This
difference wrought a difference in enforcement.  The old separate equity court often
enforced its decree by using contempt powers, fining or imprisoning the defendant until
he complied with the decree.  This is sometimes called in personam enforcement, in
contrast to the in rem enforcement at law.26
Within this historical framework, court orders regarding the future parenting
of children constituted the quintessential “equitable order.”  A custody or
visitation order was a “personal directive” in the sense described by Professor
Dobbs, requiring parents to act (or not act) in certain ways with regard to
matters affecting their children.
In the evolution of the legal systems in England and the United States, the
separate courts of law and equity ultimately merged into a single unified
judicial system.   In spite of this structural unification, judges and analysts of27
the law continue to this day to distinguish between judicial orders that
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28. Id. § 1.4, at 13 (emphasis added) (using a custody hypothetical to illustrate the point).
29. See generally JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 2[d], at 5 (1999) (“Injunctions
are a form of equitable relief whereby a defendant is ordered to do something (mandatory injunction) or
refrain from doing something (prohibitory or negative injunction).  A defendant who violates the terms of
an injunction may be sanctioned by being held in contempt of court.”).
30. See DOBBS, supra note 24, § 2.5(1).  But see id. § 1.1, at 6 (describing modern trend toward
diluting the “irreparable harm rule”).
31. The rule restricts injunctive relief to situations where legal remedies would be inadequate to
compensate the injured party.  See FISCHER, supra note 29, § 21[a], at 148-49.
32. See id. § 24, at 168-69 (noting that “equitable injunctive relief has been refused when the
required performance would be unreasonably difficult to enforce or require lengthy judicial supervision”);
adjudicate rights with an eye toward satisfaction in the form of money, and
orders that mandate personal behavior.  One meaningful consequence flowing
from this continuing distinction involves the different remedies available to
enforce each type of court order.  Remedial orders of the court directed
against the noncompliant party, such as contempt, remain the hallmark of
enforcement as to orders that would have been characterized in the past as
equitable.  Professor Dobbs has summarized these aspects of the modern legal
system following merger of the separate systems of law and equity, as follows:
Most judicial systems have long since combined law and equity courts in a single court
having the powers of both the old law and the old equity courts.  So it is technically no
longer right . . . to say that equity enforces decrees in personam while law enforces them
in rem.  However, the kind of decree equity once issued, a coercive, in personam order
directing the defendant to act in a specified way, is enforceable by contempt just as it was
when there were separate equity courts.  It is still common, by way of shorthand, to
associate contempt powers with “equity,” although it is more accurate to associate them
with a valid coercive order.28
Within this modern frame of reference, custody and visitation orders are
readily characterized as “coercive” orders.  Although divorce court orders
regarding the future parenting of children are not generally referred to as
“injunctions,” they fall squarely into the general definition of injunctive court
orders that are enforceable, inter alia, by contempt.29
The historical assignment of custody cases to the courts of equity
supports the routine entry of coercive custody orders in the modern context.
In formulating remedies in individual cases, modern courts sometimes apply
a doctrine called the “irreparable harm rule,”  which creates a preference for30
legal remedies, typically money damages, and restricts the availability of
injunctive relief.   An important consideration under this choice-of-remedies31
doctrine is the predictability of compliance with and need for extensive
judicial supervision over an injunctive order.   Notably, the limitation on32
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DOBBS, supra note 24, § 2.5(4), at 99 (“The availability of equitable remedies is . . . limited by
considerations of practicality and convenience [but] [t]he stronger the need for coercive relief, the more
willing the chancellor to grant the relief in spite of fearful anticipations.”); EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT:  SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 3.3.2, at 58-59 (1989 & Supp. 2001)
(discussing the length of time required for completion as a factor in judicial decisions whether to order
specific enforcement of a contract).
33. FISCHER, supra note 29, § 21[a], at 148 (listing “matters involving fiduciaries, . . . fraud,
mistake, and bankruptcy, to name but a few” as examples of such equitable matters).  See also DOBBS,
supra note 24, § 2.5(1), at 89.
34. Although the potential for enforcement difficulties does not deter courts from entering coercive
custody and visitation orders, the likelihood of enforcement problems may influence the terms of those
orders in individual cases.  See 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.09[4][a] (“In a few states, statutes allow the
court to consider in the initial custody decision which parent is likely to allow frequent and continuing
contact with the other parent.”); GREGORY ET AL., supra note 5, § 11.04[C] (describing judicial
consideration of the likelihood of parental cooperation and compliance, in decisions whether to establish
joint custody orders).
35. Institutional reform cases provide another setting where coercive judicial orders often involve
the courts with the parties and the subject matter of the decree for an extended period of time.  The
“structural injunction” is a remedy utilized in cases where a public institution has conducted its business
in an unconstitutional manner, such as a school district that has failed to comply with desegregation
requirements.  See FISCHER, supra note 29, § 46(c); OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 92-94
(1978).  The injunction typically requires reorganization of the public institution to bring its operation into
constitutional compliance, a process that may take many years to complete.  See James M. Hirschhorn,
Where the Money Is:  Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1815, 1816 (1984) (describing “the formal powers that are available to the federal courts” in cases
where institutional defendants assert an inability to comply with structural injunctions due to lack of
coercive or injunctive orders under the irreparable harm rule does not apply
to “those matters that had historically and traditionally been heard in equity,”33
a category that includes child custody cases.
Indeed, no traditionally “legal” or “in rem” order of the court, such as an
order to pay money, could address the goal of protecting post-divorce parent-
child relationships.  Coercive orders, designed to regulate the future conduct
of both parents and enforceable by the remedy of contempt, are the norm in
child custody cases.  Considerations involving the difficulty of future
enforcement, which influence the decision whether to enter coercive orders
under the irreparable harm doctrine, have no application in this context.34
Neither demonstrated animosities within the family, which may suggest
compliance problems in the future, nor the ages of the children, which indicate
the likely duration of the court’s order, acts as a deterrent.  Coercive orders
that endure until children reach adulthood are the norm.  The door, then, is
opened at the time of divorce to the possibility of ongoing judicial
involvement for extended periods of time, even in difficult cases.  The
doctrines relating to enforcement and remedies, discussed in Part II, take on
added significance in these circumstances.35
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financial resources); Brian K. Landsberg, The Desegregated School System and the Retrogression Plan,
48 LA. L. REV. 789 (1988) (tracing the history of litigation involving the public schools in Norfolk,
Virginia).
36. See generally 2 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 10.03[2], at 10-20 (“As long as there is no court
directive in effect, both parents continue to have equal rights in the child.”).
37. See FISCHER, supra note 29, § 314[a], at 732-33 (discussing the trespass hypothetical).
38. See YORIO, supra note 32, § 1.2.2, at 7-9.
E.  Custody Orders Are Not Premised on a Determination of Wrongdoing
An element of necessity characterizes the entry of coercive judicial orders
regarding the custody of children at the time of divorce.  State custody laws
reflect the view that such orders are necessary to protect existing parent-child
relationships, in a clear and certain manner, in light of the family’s changed
circumstances.   This context for creating coercive judicial orders differs in36
one significant aspect from the entry of coercive or injunctive orders in other
litigation settings.  Namely, in many other types of cases, such as tort and
contract cases, the coercive or injunctive order functions as a remedy for one
party based on a judicial determination of wrongdoing by the other.  No such
determination of wrongdoing by one party takes place when the court initially
establishes the coercive terms of a post-divorce parenting plan.
A description of typical injunctive orders in the fields of torts and
contracts serves to illustrate the difference.  In a tort case where the plaintiff
complains that a structure built by the defendant unlawfully encroaches on the
plaintiff’s land, the court must first determine whether a trespass has in fact
occurred.  If so, the available remedies include damages or a coercive,
injunctive order requiring the defendant to remove the encroaching structure.
In the event that injunctive relief is granted, and the defendant subsequently
fails to comply, the plaintiff then may bring an action for contempt against the
defendant.   Another familiar example arises in the context of contract37
enforcement.  Here, the court may order the defendant to perform obligations
arising under a private contract, based on a threshold determination of the
defendant’s past unlawful failure to perform them.  If the defendant
subsequently fails to comply with the order of specific performance, the
plaintiff may initiate an enforcement proceeding in which the defendant may
be held in contempt of court.38
By way of contrast, entry of the initial custody order in a divorce
proceeding involves no determination of wrongdoing by either parent.  The
custody orders of the divorce court are coercive, injunctive orders, like the
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39. Even in a fault divorce system, filing for divorce or establishing fault grounds for ending a
marriage can not be regarded as the establishment of wrongdoing in this sense.
40. CLARK, supra note 9, § 19.3, at 794.
41. FISCHER, supra note 29, § 2(f), at 6.
42. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(d)(1) (2003).  See also MO. REV. STAT. § 452.400(3) (2003) (“The
court shall mandate compliance with its order by all parties to the action . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 1653(2)(D)(5) (1998 & Supp. 2004) (The order of the court awarding parental rights and
responsibilities must include “[a] statement that violation of the order may result in a finding of contempt
and imposition of sanctions . . . .”).
injunction in a trespass case or the order to specifically perform contractual
obligations in a breach of contract case.  Furthermore, the failure by one
parent to comply with the terms of a court-ordered parenting plan entitles the
other parent to seek the same type of judicial enforcement, including contempt
remedies, available in the tort and contract examples.  The distinction
highlighted here is the absence of any unlawful conduct by one party, such as
the commission of a tort or breach of a contract, underlying the entry of the
initial custody order.39
Professor Clark addressed this aspect of initial custody and visitation
orders, involving the absence of any claim or finding of wrongdoing, when he
observed that “[i]n its practical consequences [the custody proceeding in
equity] is much like a declaratory judgment suit . . . .”   That is, the function40
of the custody order is to articulate the respective rights and responsibilities
of the parents under a post-divorce parenting plan.  This characterization as
a “declaratory judgment,” however, fails to capture the coercive aspect of the
typical custody order.  As a general rule, the declaratory judgment “does not
compel an immediate, specific obligation to do something.  Such judgments
lack an ‘operative command.’”41
While the court-ordered parenting plan could be viewed as a mere
declaration of the respective rights and responsibilities of the parents
regarding the future residence of and decision making for their minor children,
divorce courts typically intend to do more.  That is, they intend to set the
family plan in motion by mandating certain conduct of the parties.
Indeed, the custody statutes in several states require divorce courts to
clearly state that the terms of their orders are mandatory.  For example, the
Rhode Island statute provides that “[t]he court shall mandate compliance with
its order . . . . In the event of noncompliance, the [aggrieved person] may file
a motion for contempt . . . .”42
In the absence of such express guidance, parents have sometimes
questioned whether custody and visitation orders are, in fact, mandates
regarding future conduct.  For example, an order in the case of MacIntosh v.
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43. 749 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
44. Id. at 628-29.
45. Id. at 629-30.
46. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).  Notably, the Indiana court in MacIntosh did not refer to the state
statute discussed infra at text accompanying notes 47-48.  It is not clear that the statute was in effect at the
time of the 1997 contempt hearing in this case.  See also Bowen v. Bowen, 198 S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga. 1973)
(rejecting mother’s “conten[tion] that [mother] cannot be in contempt for the alleged violation because the
divorce decree does not order her to perform any act but merely defines the father’s visitation rights”).
47. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-14-15-1, -2 (LexisNexis 2003).
48. See id. § 31-14-15-4.
MacIntosh  provided that “[mother is] ordered to obtain [daughter’s]43
passport”; and “the parties’ children . . . are ordered to accompany their
[f]ather . . . on the trip to Switzerland.”   When the trip did not occur as44
scheduled, the father initiated an enforcement action against the mother,
alleging her noncompliance with this judicial order.  In response, the mother
argued that the court order “expressly commanded her only to obtain a
passport for [the daughter],” and that “the order . . . did not put her on notice
that she was to do anything [else].”   The MacIntosh court rejected this45
position, stating that “[a]s the parent with legal custody and authority over her
minor daughters, [mother] was impliedly ordered to make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the children complied with the scheduled parenting time.”46
Therefore, the mother’s failure to make reasonable efforts to support the
scheduled trip constituted a violation of the custody order, and she was held
in contempt of court.
The Indiana legislature has defined the effect of visitation orders in a
more restrictive manner.  The Indiana visitation enforcement statute provides
that a parent whose court-ordered visitation rights have been violated is
entitled to a temporary restraining order or injunction, requiring the custodial
parent to obey the initial visitation order in the future.   An action for47
contempt and other equitable enforcement remedies only become available in
a second enforcement proceeding, upon proof of the custodial parent’s
subsequent violation of this injunction.   In this manner, the Indiana statute48
fails to treat the initial visitation order itself as an injunctive or coercive order.
Indeed, the two-step enforcement procedure, requiring the initial entry of an
injunction based on past wrongdoing, is parallel to the use of injunctive relief
in the tort and contract scenarios described above.
The provisions of the Indiana visitation enforcement statute are
exceptional in this regard.  Under the laws of most states, illustrated by the
ruling in the MacIntosh case, initial custody and visitation orders are regarded
as coercive orders of the divorce court whose breach may give rise to
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49. See 4 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[3].
50. See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1987).  See generally Jessica Pearson & Jean
Anhalt, Enforcing Visitation Rights:  Innovative Programs in Five State Courts May Provide Answers to
This Difficult Problem, JUDGES’ J., Spring 1994, at 2, 6 (discussing the incidence of parental concern about
child safety in visitation enforcement cases).
The mother in Morgan was jailed under a contempt order in the District of Columbia after hiding her
child from the father whom she considered abusive.  Her refusal to comply with the contempt order by
revealing her child’s location resulted in a lengthy period of incarceration, which ended when Congress
enacted a time limit on imprisonments for civil contempt in child custody cases in the District of Columbia.
See David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 4 BYU J. PUB.
equitable remedies for the violation of an injunctive court order, including
contempt.  The establishment of coercive orders in this manner, in the absence
of any finding of wrongdoing by one party, is a special feature of the child
custody context.  State custody laws require this form of regulation, based on
an assumption that established family relationships require protective state
action at the time of parental divorce.
PART II:  ENFORCEMENT
Part I analyzed the nature of custody orders as coercive court orders.  Part
II will explore the issue of enforcement, in particular, the judicial
implementation of contempt remedies for the violation of custody orders.  As
described in Part I, the priority assigned by the family law system to
post-divorce parent-child relationships results in the routine entry of coercive
court orders.  As revealed in this Part, the same protective concern for
parent-child relationships also shapes the enforcement doctrines in this field.
A.  Noncompliance With Custody Orders
Judicial orders creating post-divorce parenting plans are generally
designed to regulate the conduct of family members for an extended period of
time, until the children reach adulthood.  A parent may be dissatisfied with
custody and visitation orders at the time of divorce, or dissatisfaction may
develop over time.  State custody laws provide that either parent may seek
judicial modification in certain circumstances.   Absent such judicial action,49
however, the parents remain obligated to perform the duties imposed upon
them at the time of divorce.
In some cases, divorced parents fail to comply over time with the terms
of their court-ordered parenting plans.  The noncompliant parent may be
motivated by concern for the children’s well-being,  as in the hypothetical50
2007] ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY ORDERS 851
L. 239, 256-78 (1990) (discussing in detail the facts of the Morgan case and the Congressional response);
Randal S. White, Comment, Civil Contempt and Congressional Interference in the Case of Morgan v.
Foretich, 95 DICK. L. REV. 353 (1991); Marcia Coyle, A Question of Contempt, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 30, 1989,
at 1.
51. See 4 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 47.01[2], at 47-49 (“In all jurisdictions, proceedings to enforce
the custody or visitation provisions of a [divorce] decree, or agreement incorporated in a decree, are viewed
as an integral part of the court’s continuing power to compel performance of its mandates.”).  As a general
rule, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required in a contempt proceeding.  See CLARK, supra
note 9, § 19.10, at 848.  There is a split of authority as to whether the jurisdictional base established in an
earlier divorce or custody proceeding confers jurisdiction in the custody enforcement hearing.  See 4
LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[1][b], at 25-136 to -138.  Additional jurisdictional issues arise in interstate
custody enforcement cases, see LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 15:14, at
15-37 to -41 (2004), and international cases, see id. §§ 15:20 to :27.
52. See Amy Koel et al., Patterns of Relitigation in the Postdivorce Family, 56 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 265 (1994).
53. The second piece of quantitative information required to understand the incidence of custody
enforcement issues is the number of divorces involving the parents of minor children.  The rate of divorce
in families with children is high.  See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 626 (1978) (“Of
the nearly one million divorces each year, an estimated 62% involve children.”).  See generally
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 6, at 134 (“Today, more than 1 million marriages end in divorce each year.”).
54. Koel et al., supra note 52, at 270.  There was likely an additional number of families where one
parent believed that the other had not complied with the terms of post-divorce custody and visitation orders,
was not satisfied with the status quo, but did not bring the matter to the attention of the court.  See Ira
Daniel Turkat, Child Visitation Interference in Divorce, 14 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 737, 742 (1994)
case discussed earlier where the noncustodial parent subjected a child to
unauthorized elective surgery.  Other reasons for noncompliance may include
the belief that a custody order is unfair, the desire to inflict harm on a former
spouse, or the inability of parents to overcome practical hurdles or to
communicate with each other.  In the event of noncompliance by one parent,
the other has standing to initiate an enforcement proceeding.51
An important empirical study of post-divorce litigation, published in
1994, revealed that a significant number of divorced parents returned to court
in this manner alleging noncompliance with custody and visitation orders.52
The study involved 700 couples with children who obtained divorces in the
family court in Cambridge, Massachusetts between 1978 and 1984.  The
researchers studied the court records for all of these families through 1988,
thus tracking their litigation histories for periods ranging from four to ten
years.
The Cambridge study reported on the incidence of post-divorce litigation
regarding custody, visitation, support and property issues.   The researchers’53
overall conclusion was that “[t]he amount of relitigation was remarkable; 41%
(287) of the 700 families had relitigated by the end of the data collection . . .
with a mean of 4.3 motions [per family].”   The report broke down these post-54
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(citing studies indicating a high incidence of “visitation interference” and calling for more research on the
subject); Pearson & Anhalt, supra note 50, at 3 (“Noncustodial parent groups have complained that
visitation interference is widespread and that the increasingly aggressive enforcement of child support
obligations has not been matched by an equally aggressive enforcement of visitation rights.”).
55. Koel et al., supra note 52, at 271, tbl. 2.
56. Id.
57. Id.  Several additional studies have reported on relitigation rates without distinguishing between
child access issues and financial issues.  See, e.g., Bruce Berger et al., Child Custody and Relitigation:
Trends in a Rural Setting, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 604, 606 (1988) (reporting an overall relitigation
rate of approximately twenty percent among 884 divorced families with children whose divorces were
granted and histories were tracked during the period 1980-1984 in a rural North Carolina county); Deborah
Anna Luepnitz, A Comparison of Maternal, Paternal, and Joint Custody:  Understanding the Varieties
of Post-Divorce Family Life, 1986 J. DIVORCE 1, 5 (reporting, in a study of forty-three post-divorce
families, that “none of the joint families had relitigated, whereas 56% of the single custody parents had
returned to court at least once to battle over money and visitation”) (emphasis added)).
Other studies distinguish between custody issues and financial issues, but do not break down the
custody category into modification and enforcement subcategories.  See, e.g., Peter Ash & Melvin T. Guyer,
Relitigation After Contested Custody and Visitation Evaluations, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
323, 327 (1986) (reporting, in a study of fifty-eight “high conflict” divorce cases, that nineteen percent of
families returned to court over custody issues, seventeen percent over visitation issues, and thirty-six
percent over child support issues); Laurie Kramer & Amanda Kowal, Long-Term Followup of a Court-
Based Intervention for Divorcing Parents, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 452, 455-56 (1998).
58. Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 400 (2000).  The
divorce motions into subject matter categories:  26.1 percent of the 287
relitigating families raised custody issues; 27.2 percent raised visitation issues;
and 88.2 percent raised financial issues (property, alimony and child support
combined).   In a further breakdown of child-related issues, 1.7 percent of the55
relitigating families went back to court in custody contempt cases; 25.1
percent in custody modification cases; 12.5 percent in visitation contempt
cases; and 17.4 percent in visitation modification cases.   Thus, a total of 14.256
percent of relitigating families, or 41 of the 700 families studied, raised
custody and visitation enforcement (contempt) issues, the subject of this
Article.57
B.  The Public and Private Interests at Stake
The enforcement of custody or visitation orders, in a proceeding initiated
by one parent alleging noncompliance by the other, protects important public
and private interests.  First, as a general rule in civil litigation, the
enforcement of court orders reinforces the credibility of the courts and a
general attitude of public deference to judicial authority.  Thus, “[t]he judicial
system arguably could not survive as an effective institution unless it could
punish disobedience of orders or disruption of its proceedings . . . .”58
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disobedience of court orders, including custody orders, is referred to as “indirect” contempt of the court,
and the form of contempt that involves misbehavior in the courtroom is labeled “direct” contempt.  See id.
at 349-54.
59. Laurence C. Nolan, Beyond Troxel:  The Pragmatic Challenges to Grandparent Visitation
Continue, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 267, 285 (2002).  See also 4 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[2][a], at 25-146
(“[T]he notion persists that the flouting of the [custody] court’s authority must be vindicated in order to
maintain respect for the courts and their directives.”).
60. See generally Livingston, supra note 58, at 401 (describing the manner in which the law of
contempt protects the private interests of the complaining party).
61. See Nolan, supra note 59, at 285.
62. Although less common than the enforcement of residential custody orders, parents may also seek
Professor Lawrence Nolan applied this general observation to the specific
context of visitation orders, as follows:  “The public . . . has an interest.
Visitation orders are not like money judgments.  Noncompliance with a
visitation order is . . . showing disrespect to the court.”   Within this frame of59
reference, the entry of remedial orders in custody and visitation enforcement
proceedings serves to strengthen the judicial system.
Beyond this public interest in maintaining respect for the institution of the
courts, the enforcement of custody and visitation orders vindicates private
interests as well.   Both the complaining parent and the children are directly60
affected by the other parent’s noncompliance with a court-ordered parenting
plan.  From the children’s perspective, the initial parenting plan orders were
deemed by the court at the time of their entry to serve the children’s interests.
Therefore, a significant variation by one parent from the terms of the plan, to
which the other parent objects, is assumed to be contrary to the children’s
interests.   In addition, one parent’s noncompliance with the terms of a61
parenting plan clearly interferes with the established rights of the other.  The
complaining parent initiates a custody or visitation enforcement proceeding
in order to vindicate these private family interests.
If the court determines that one parent has violated the terms of a court-
ordered parenting plan, the court must then select and impose appropriate
remedies and sanctions.  The general purpose of such remedial action is
vindication of the public and private interests described in this Section.
C.  Remedies
Upon finding that one parent has violated the terms of a parenting plan,
the court must establish remedial goals, and impose sanctions designed to
achieve them.  Most enforcement cases involve the noncompliance by one
parent with residential parenting orders,  and the most frequently stated goal62
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the enforcement of orders governing post-divorce decision making responsibility and orders governing other
aspects of parental behavior.  See Lane v. Lane, 779 A.2d 859, 861 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (affirming
contempt adjudication for mother’s violation of a court order that “the [mother] shall not initiate medical,
therapy or educational care for the children without the prior written consent of the [father] except in the
case of emergency”); Nelson v. Nelson, 598 N.Y.S. 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (involving the
enforcement of custody provisions requiring the mother to “refrain from engaging in harassing conduct”
and “consult with [the father] concerning . . . the children’s education and psychological counseling”);
Ryder v. Ryder, No. 2001CA00190, 2002 WL 258218, *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002) (affirming
contempt order based on the mother’s failure to “communicate with” the father).
63. See generally RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 9-25 (1963) (tracing the rise and
establishment of the contempt power of the courts in England and the United States); Livingston, supra
note 58, at 356-78 (tracing the history of contempt law in the United States).
Critics of broad judicial contempt powers highlight the inherent intrusion on the individual autonomy of
contemnors involved in their exercise.  See GOLDFARB, supra note 63, at 3; Harmer, supra note 50, at 245
(“Although many courts and commentators have uncritically accepted ‘the . . . view that contempt powers
are a necessary and inherent element of judicial power,’ modern research finds them neither inherent nor
necessary.” (citation omitted)).  Conversely, proponents emphasize the interests of the complainant whose
rights under an existing court order have been violated.  See Livingston, supra note 58, at 348 (“[A]lthough
alleged contemnors are certainly entitled to adequate procedures before the court may impose sanctions [in
a contempt proceeding], successful plaintiffs are equally deserving of an effective remedy without undue
delay.”).
64. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 290 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(2)(e) (2004); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-87 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728(b)(5) (1999); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 571-8.5 (LexisNexis 1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/607.1, /611 (LexisNexis 1999); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-4-8(1) (LexisNexis 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.23(1) (West 2001); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.240(2) (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4611 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(7) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 552.641(1)(b), .644 (West 2002); MO. REV.
STAT. § 452.400(3) (2000 & Supp. 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364.15 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 125C.030, .040 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.3(a) (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2705.031(B)(2) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 111.1(C)(1) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
is to bring the violator into compliance in the future.  The court may, however,
articulate additional goals in this context, most notably, the punishment of a
parent for past violations or compensation of the complaining parent for his
or her resulting losses.  Various remedies, including civil and criminal
contempt, are tailored to achieve each of these goals.
Under the laws of most states, the range of judicial remedies for the
violation of custody and visitation orders is wide.  First, contempt remedies
become available whenever parental noncompliance is viewed as the violation
of a coercive or injunctive order of the court.  Under general contempt
doctrines in every state, the courts are empowered to directly enforce their
injunctive orders.   Typical sanctions under these general contempt doctrines63
are a fine and imprisonment, in amounts and for time periods that may be
limited by state law.  In the family law area, statutes in more than half of the
states detail the availability of contempt remedies in custody and visitation
enforcement cases.64
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§ 107.135(14)(b)(B) (2005); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4346 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-38 (1997); S.C.R.
PROC. FAM. CT. 27 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4A-1, -2 (1999); TEX. FAM CODE ANN.
§ 157.001(b) (Vernon 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 603, 668(d) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.160(1) (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-304, 51-2A-9 (LexisNexis 2004); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2-204(b) (2005).
65. See 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[2][b]; James A. Albert & Gregory A. Brodek, Habeas
Corpus—A Better Remedy in Visitation Denial Cases, 41 ME. L. REV. 239, 252-54 (1989) (comparing
effectiveness and other aspects of habeas corpus and contempt remedies in visitation interference cases).
66. 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[2][b], at 32-419 (italics omitted).
67. See id. § 32.11[2][d].
68. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.19 Reporter’s Notes cmt. c (collecting state statutes that
“include modification of the underlying order among the possible remedies for violation of a custody order
or parenting plan”).
69. See id.
70. See 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[2][c]; 4 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[5].
Besides contempt, the habeas corpus doctrine has traditionally provided
a remedy for the violation of custody and visitation orders in certain
circumstances.   The parent entitled to custody has standing to initiate a65
proceeding, wherein the other parent must produce the child in court.
Professor Arnold Rutkin has noted the limitations of this remedy for many
common custody enforcement fact patterns:
Habeas corpus will not be an effective remedy in all situations.  When the period of
wrongful detainment is very short, the issue may become moot before the writ can be
processed.  Additionally, a writ of habeas corpus will not alone deter future interference
with custody or visitation rights.66
Another potential remedy for the violation of parenting plan orders
involves the modification of certain terms of the parents’ divorce decree.  The
terms subject to possible modification are the alimony and child support
provisions,  or even the violated custody and visitation orders.   These67 68
modification sanctions, however, are controversial and are not uniformly
accepted by state legislatures and courts as remedies for noncompliance with
custody and visitation orders.69
The courts in many states have the authority to require noncompliant
parents to post a bond, which is forfeitable to the court in the event of any
future violation of the initial custody order.   The primary goal here is to70
coerce compliance by tying a defined financial sanction to subsequent
noncompliance.
In recent years, a number of state legislatures have added new remedies
to their custody statutes, in order to provide more flexible options to the courts
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71. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.19 Reporter’s Notes cmts. a-d.
72. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5 (2004).
73. Id. § 14-10-129.5(2)(h).  Besides the enforcement tools available in the family court, some
jurisdictions establish tort and criminal causes of action relating to the interference with parental rights.
See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15:17 (discussing tort doctrines); 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[3]
(discussing criminal law).  For example, the Colorado “parenting time dispute” statute discussed in the text
provides that “[n]othing in this section shall preclude a party’s right to a separate and independent legal
action in tort.”  COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(4).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.3(e) (West 2000).
75. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4346(a)(4) (2004).
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.3(b).
77. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3131 (West 2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.425 (2000) (“Any court order
for the custody of, or visitation with, a child may include a provision that the sheriff . . . shall enforce the
rights of any person to custody or visitation . . . .”); N.J. CT. R. 5:3-7 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.437
(2005) (authorizing “order of assistance” to enforce custody, but not visitation, rights); 3 RUTKIN, supra
note 4, § 32.11[2][g].
78. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.11 (describing circumstances in which the court may
modify a custody order by terminating the custodial responsibility of a parent).
79. Custody enforcement schemes that include the contempt remedy in this manner as an alternative
to specified noncontempt remedies follow a pattern described by Professor Dobbs as to the general
enforcement of coercive court orders:
in carrying out the responsibility of custody enforcement.   For example, the71
Colorado statute governing “[d]isputes concerning parenting time”  contains72
versions of the contempt, modification and security remedies described above.
In addition, the statute provides for court-mandated mediation, parental
education, family counseling, makeup parenting time, civil fines payable to
the state treasurer, the payment of attorney fees, court costs and expenses to
the petitioning parent, and “[a]ny other order that may promote the best
interests of the child.”   Additional remedies appearing in the corresponding73
provisions of other state family codes include “other economic sanctions
which may be decided on a case-by-case basis,”  suspension of the74
noncompliant parent’s driver’s license,  community service,  and a warrant75 76
or writ issued by the court to involve law enforcement personnel in the
custody enforcement effort.77
Notably, the list of remedies does not routinely include the denial of
future custody rights to the parent who violated custody orders in the past.
The state interest in protecting children’s relationships with their parents,
reflected in the initial coercive order of the divorce court, also supports their
maintenance over time except in extreme cases.78
The place of the traditional contempt remedy within the elaborate array
of remedial options in the custody enforcement field varies from state to state.
One model, illustrated by the Colorado statute summarized above, includes
contempt as an alternative to specified noncontempt remedies,  including the79
2007] ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY ORDERS 857
[E]quitable decrees are traditionally in personam, that is, personal orders to the defendant to act
in a particular way. . . . Because they are personal orders, they are often enforced coercively,
through the contempt power.  They may also be enforced in other, less drastic ways, however.
DOBBS, supra note 24, § 2.8(1), at 130.  See generally Livingston, supra note 58, at 421 (“Of course, not
every order lends itself to noncontempt enforcement mechanisms . . . . In some cases, the defendants’
personal performance will be required to ensure that the proper result is attained.  If the defendants simply
refuse to comply and other enforcement mechanisms are not practicable, contempt sanctions may be the
only route for achieving enforcement of the order.”).
80. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(2)(e) (2004).  This statute provides no guidance to the courts
about the appropriate amount of a fine, or length of a jail sentence.  Family court contempt provisions in
other jurisdictions fill these numerical gaps.  For example, the South Dakota statute limits fines to $1000,
and jail sentences to three days.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-5 (1999).
81. A final approach to the codification of contempt doctrine for the purpose of child custody and
visitation enforcement involves legislative silence.  The family codes in some jurisdictions make no
reference to contempt remedies, leaving the custody courts to determine the proper application of the state’s
general contempt law in custody cases.
82. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.644(2) (West 2002).
83. Id.  See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(7) (1998) (“If the court finds that a parent
has violated a part of the order, the court may find that parent in contempt and may . . . [o]rder that
additional visitation be provided for a parent to take the place of visitation that was wrongfully denied; or
. . . [o]rder a parent found in contempt to pay a forfeiture of at least $100.”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4346(a)
(2004) (authorizing fines, imprisonment, probation, and the revocation of licenses as sanctions for
contempt); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.160(2)(b) (West 2005) (authorizing make-up residential time
with the children, reimbursement of the other parent’s attorney fees and expenses, as well as fines and
imprisonment, as sanctions for contempt).
posting of a bond, modification of the divorce decree, family education
programs, and mediation.  Thus, the list of remedies under this statute also
includes “[a]n order finding the parent who did not comply with the parenting
time schedule in contempt of court and imposing a fine or jail sentence.”80
A second category of state custody enforcement laws establishes a
different relationship between the contempt remedy and other statutory
enforcement mechanisms.   Namely, the other enforcement devices are81
included as sanctions for contempt, along with the traditional sanctions of a
fine or jail sentence.  For example, the Michigan statute provides a lengthy list
of sanctions available in “civil contempt proceeding[s] to resolve . . .
dispute[s] concerning parenting time.”   Upon finding a parent in contempt,82
the court may “modify the parenting time order . . . [;] [o]rder that makeup
parenting time be provided . . . [;] [o]rder the parent to pay a fine of not more
than $100 . . . [;] commit the parent to the county jail . . . [;] condition the
suspension of [a] license . . . upon noncompliance with an order for makeup
and ongoing parenting time . . . [;] [and/or] order the parent to participate in
a community corrections program . . . .”   Under this model, the range of83
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84. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15:6, at 15-19 (2004).
85. 313 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
86. Id. at 139.  See also 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[2], at 32-415 to 416 (discussing cases
involving claims that custody and visitation orders were too vague to be enforceable).
87. See 4 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[2][c], at 25-159 to -162; 4 RUTKIN, supra note 4,
§ 47.06[2], at 47-69 n.10 (collecting and summarizing cases involving the issue of willful noncompliance).
Numerous cases involving the willfulness of parental noncompliance with custody and visitation orders
involve older children who were, according to the allegedly noncompliant parent, unwilling to spend time
sanctions for contempt in child custody enforcement cases far exceeds the
traditional contempt sanctions of fines and imprisonment.
In most reported custody and visitation enforcement cases, the
complaining parents sought sanctions associated with the remedy of contempt
under state law.  The selection of remedy and imposition of sanctions by the
court in each case depended on the circumstances of the family, the nature of
the parenting plan violations, and the remedial goals set by the court.  As
described in the remainder of this Article, contempt remedies in the field of
child custody have been used by the courts in a flexible manner to achieve the
important goals associated with the enforcement of court-ordered parenting
plans.
D.  Judicial Discretion in Contempt Cases
Trial courts exercise discretion as to all aspects of a custody contempt
proceeding, and the general standard of review on appeal is the abuse of
discretion standard.   This aspect of custody enforcement doctrine involves84
the application of general rules governing judicial contempt proceedings to the
family law setting.
In custody enforcement proceedings, the court must first determine
whether the allegedly noncompliant parent willfully violated the terms of
established parenting plan orders.  As to this threshold determination,
recurring issues on appeal involve the clarity of the custody terms and the
willfulness of the contemnor’s failure to comply with them.  For example, the
“clarity” issue provided the basis for reversal of a mother’s conviction for
contempt in the case of Kranis v. Kranis.   There, the appellate court ruled85
that a term in the custody decree providing for “reasonable visitation” was not
“clear and definite,” and the trial court’s contrary conclusion on this key issue
constituted an abuse of discretion.86
A second appealable element in the threshold determination of unlawful
conduct involves the willfulness of the parent’s violation of the court-ordered
parenting plan.   In the case of In re Marriage of S.G. and V.G.,  for87 88
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with the other parent.  See 4 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[2][c], at 25-159.
88. 824 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
89. Id. at 110.  See also In re Marriage of Herkert, 615 N.E.2d 833, 836-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(stating that “[w]hether . . . a party is guilty of contempt rests within the sole discretion of the trial court,”
in affirming a finding that mother’s failure to make children available for visitation with father was not
willful); Midyett v. Midyett, 744 So. 2d 669, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he facts leading up to the lost
visitation . . . do not rise to the level of willful, contemptuous behavior warranting reversal of the trial
court’s abundant discretion.”) (emphasis added).
90. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15:7, at 15-23 (“The court has discretion and some flexibility in
fashioning the appropriate remedy for civil contempt.”).
91. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 25-4A-5 (1999) (imposing limits on the amount of fines and
length of jail sentences for “violation of the custody or visitation provisions of a court decree”).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 132-52.
93. As described above, see text accompanying notes 79-80, the custody enforcement statutes in
some states provide for contempt sanctions beyond the traditional sanctions of a fine or imprisonment.  See
also In re Marriage of Almquist, 704 N.E.2d 68, 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (affirming trial court’s
determination of mother’s criminal contempt for interfering with father’s right to talk to children by
telephone and her “sentence[ ] . . . to two years of court supervision”).
94. 597 S.E.2d 897 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
95. Id. at 898.
96. Id. at 900.  See also In re Marriage of Knutson, 413 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(ruling that “trial court did not abuse its discretion in staying the consequences of contempt” against mother
in a visitation enforcement proceeding).  But see In re Marriage of Wolk, 828 P.2d 634, 636 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992) (construing the word “shall” in the state custody contempt statute to remove judicial discretion
example, the trial court found that a mother had good cause for withholding
scheduled visitation, due to her child’s illness.  On appeal, the S.G. court
affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that noncompliance with the custody
order in these circumstances had not been willful,  and that the mother was89
not guilty of contempt.
Upon determining that a parent willfully violated the clearly-stated terms
of a custody order, the court must select appropriate sanctions.90
Discretionary elements in the formulation of sanctions for contempt include
the amount of fines and the length of jail sentences, which may be limited by
statute,  the conditions associated with indeterminate fines and jail91
sentences,  and the imposition of sanctions other than fines and jail92
sentences.   In addition, the court may find a parent to be in violation of a93
custody order, but decline to impose any sanction.  The trial court in Hawkins
v. Mullins,  for example, found the mother to be in contempt of court “for94
allowing a prohibited third party to be present during a visitation exchange,”95
but did not impose any sanction.  The appellate court in Hawkins affirmed this
decision, stating that “[e]ven though a party is found to have violated a court
order, the question of whether or not to impose sanctions remains a matter for
the [trial] court’s discretion.”96
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about ordering the contemnor to pay “all court costs and reasonable attorney fees . . . and . . . a civil penalty
of not less than $100”) (quoting state statute currently codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.160(2)(b) (West 2005)).
97. 598 N.Y.S.2d 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
98. Id. at 612.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 611-12.
101. Id. at 611.
By way of contrast, the trial court’s decision about appropriate sanctions
for contempt received less deference from the appellate court in the case of
Nelson v. Nelson.   There, the initial custody order required the mother “to97
bring the children to . . . scheduled visitation dates.”   The trial court found98
the mother in contempt for failing to comply with the visitation schedule on
two occasions, and imposed as sanctions a fine and an award of attorney fees
to the father.  On appeal, the Nelson court affirmed the trial court’s contempt
determination based on the missed visitation, but reversed the decision
regarding sanctions.  According to the appellate court, “a monetary fine is
simply too harsh a punishment under the circumstances . . . ; a warning to
respondent concerning the consequences of future transgressions of this nature
is sufficient.”99
The appellate court in Nelson also reversed the trial court’s entry of two
additional contempt citations against the mother, relating to other provisions
of the custody order.  Those provisions required the mother to “refrain from
engaging in ‘harassing’ conduct” and “consult with [father] concerning . . . the
children’s educational and psychological counseling.”   The trial court in100
Nelson determined that the mother had violated the “harassment” requirement
when she “made two complaints to the State child abuse hotline regarding
[father] that were ultimately determined to be unfounded,”  and that she had101
also violated the “consult with father” term of the custody order.  On appeal,
however, the appellate court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in
making these determinations, and reversed the contempt citations against her.
Thus, trial court decisions regarding both the violation of custody orders
and the appropriate sanctions for contempt are reviewable on appeal under the
abuse of discretion standard.  Additional grounds for appeal in many custody
enforcement cases turn on the characterization of the contempt citation as
either civil or criminal, a matter discussed in the next section.
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102. In Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988), a child support enforcement case, the Supreme Court
held that the characterization of a contempt as civil or criminal turns upon the nature of the sanctions
imposed, highlighting the distinctions described in the text.  See generally Harmer, supra note 50, at 248
(criticizing the sanction-based test for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt).
103. FISCHER, supra note 29, § 312[c][i], at 724.
104. Ryder v. Ryder, No. 2001CA00190, 2002 WL 258218, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002)
(citations omitted) (quoting the trial court transcript).
105. See infra text accompanying notes 130-50 (discussing coercive contempt orders in custody
enforcement cases).
E.  The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt
A basic dichotomy in general contempt doctrine draws a line between
“civil contempt” and “criminal contempt.”  The distinction has important
consequences in the field of custody enforcement.  The characterization of a
contempt order as “civil” or “criminal” is based primarily on the nature of the
sanctions imposed upon the contemnor, which reflect the purpose of the
order.102
The type of sanction typically associated with criminal contempt is the
determinate jail sentence or fine payable to the court, intended to punish the
contemnor for disrespect shown to the court in disobeying its prior order.103
For example, an Ohio appellate court provided the following description of the
criminal contempt order in a child visitation case:
[T]he trial court found [mother] guilty of willful contempt for violating the court’s
visitation order . . . and sentenced her to 30 days in jail and fined her $250.  The purpose
of the prison sentence and fine was punitive. . . . [T]he trial court expressed its disgust
with the parents . . . and stated on the record that it was “done messing with this case”
and that this was “the last straw.”104
Based on this record, the appellate court concluded that the contempt order
was criminal, not civil, in nature.
By way of contrast, the sanctions for civil contempt are designed to be
remedial rather than punitive, by coercing the contemnor’s future compliance
with the original court order or compensating the private party who suffered
damages as a result of past violations.  The most common coercive sanctions
are the indeterminate jail sentence or a serial fine that is terminable upon the
contemnor’s compliance with the original court order.   For example, the105
court may impose a daily fine upon the parent who unlawfully retains the
physical custody of children, payable to the court each day until the children
are returned to the other parent.  The second category of remedial sanctions
is compensatory in purpose, and often involves the payment of fines to
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106. See infra text accompanying notes 151-72 (discussing compensatory contempt orders in custody
enforcement cases).
107. See 4 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 47.06[2], at 47-72.
108. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 219-22 (1974).
109. White, supra note 50, at 357.
110. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ruchala, 567 N.E.2d 725, 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (reversing
mother’s contempt citation for violating visitation order); Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 709
(Iowa 1986) (same).
111. See, e.g., Curlee v. Howle, 287 S.E.2d 915 (S.C. 1982) (holding that the contempt was civil and
no jury trial was required, where father’s sentence of one year in prison for violating a custody order was
terminable upon his payment of damage award to mother).  In Bloom v. State, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the
Supreme Court ruled that the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally guaranteed in all criminal contempt
cases, but only in those where the sanctions for contempt indicate a serious, not petty, offense.  This
principle was applied in the visitation enforcement case of McDonald v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182, 1192
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002), where the absence of a jury trial provided no basis for reversing the father’s criminal
contempt conviction for violating a visitation order, because the contempt was characterized by the
appellate court as a “petty crime.”
112. See Landingham v. Landingham, 685 So. 2d 946, 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (requiring
notice in the form of an order to show cause to mother who violated a custody order restricting her
relocation, because the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature).
113. See In re Marriage of Vanderpool, 634 N.E.2d 11, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (listing notice,
opportunity to answer and prepare a defense, and burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as procedural
protections required in criminal contempt proceeding in visitation enforcement case).
individuals injured by the contemnor’s unlawful behavior.   Thus, the parent106
who violates a custody order may be required to reimburse the other parent for
his or her resulting losses including, for example, expenses incurred in
enforcing the order.
Several important legal consequences follow from the characterization of
a contempt adjudication as either criminal or civil.  First, although a judicial
hearing is required in every contempt case,  the additional procedural107
requirements are more onerous in criminal contempt proceedings.  Many of
the procedural protections guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution to
defendants in criminal trials are also required in criminal contempt cases.108
Thus, the accused contemnor enjoys a presumption of innocence,  and the109
heightened burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies in criminal
contempt cases.   Similarly, the right to a jury trial is guaranteed in many110
criminal contempt proceedings, but not in civil contempt cases.   Additional111
procedural guarantees relate to the form of notice of the contempt
proceeding,  and the opportunity to prepare a defense,  and confront112 113
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114. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15.5, at 15-17 to -18 (listing the right to a jury trial, right to
counsel, presumption of innocence, standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to confront
witnesses as procedural protections required in criminal contempt proceedings).
115. The amount of certainty required about the nature of the contempt proceeding, in child custody
and visitation cases where due process violations are raised on appeal, seems to vary widely.  Compare
Korolko v. Korolko, 803 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that trial court’s failure to mention
the heightened burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before imposing a fixed, six-month jail sentence
did not constitute error, because “[n]othing in the record indicates that the chancellor was unaware of the
proper burden of proof in this criminal contempt proceeding”) and Lo v. Lo, 878 So. 2d 424, 426 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (“[G]iven the ambiguity of the proceedings below, and failure of the trial court to afford the
procedural safeguards [required] if the proceeding was intended to be criminal in nature, we are compelled
to reverse and remand this case . . . .”).
116. 449 So. 2d 633 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
117. Id. at 636.  See also State v. Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (ruling that
double jeopardy did not bar father’s prosecution for child stealing even if earlier contempt adjudication was
characterized as criminal, because “although arising out of some of the same conduct . . . [the crime of child
stealing was] predicated upon different elements”); Ex parte Jones, 36 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(ruling that double jeopardy did not bar mother’s criminal prosecution for custodial interference, because
her earlier contempt adjudication was characterized on appeal as civil).
The Illinois statute governing the “[e]nforcement of visitation orders” expressly disallows the entry
of “a contempt order for visitation abuse against any person for the same conduct for which the person was
convicted of unlawful visitation interference [under the criminal code].”  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/607.1(g) (LexisNexis 1999).
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
119. 954 S.W.2d 249 (Ark. 1997).
witnesses.   The failure to provide any of these protections constitutes114
reversible error in criminal contempt cases.115
The double jeopardy rule is another constitutional protection for criminal
defendants that has been extended to the criminal contempt context.  For
example, the father in State v. Hope  successfully invoked the double116
jeopardy rule to prevent his prosecution for the crime of kidnapping based on
the abduction of his child for a period of five months.  According to the court,
a prior adjudication of the father’s criminal contempt in the family court,
based on the same wrongful conduct, barred the subsequent prosecution in
criminal court.117
The civil/criminal distinction in the law of contempt has ramifications in
other substantive law contexts, for the parent who has been cited for the
violation of a custody order.  For example, a provision of the Bankruptcy Act
automatically stays certain civil litigation matters in state court, pending the
outcome of bankruptcy proceedings.   This automatic stay extends to civil118
contempt orders, but not to criminal contempt orders.  The state court in
Arkansas applied this federal rule in the family law case of Hutchins v.
Hutchins.   There, the court refused to suspend a contempt citation, issued119
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120. Although the custody contempt statutes in some jurisdictions include separate provisions for
civil and criminal contempt, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.3(a) (2003) (“An order providing for the
custody of a minor child is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and its disobedience may be
punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in [the general state statute governing criminal
contempt].”), many do not.  For example, the Colorado statute regarding enforcement of parenting time
orders simply provides for the entry of “[a]n order finding the parent who did not comply with the parenting
time schedule in contempt of court and imposing a fine or jail sentence.”  COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-10-129.5(2)(e) (2004).
121. DOBBYN, supra note 108, at 217.
122. An additional layer of complexity exists in states that include contempt as a misdemeanor or
felony offense within their criminal codes.  See, e.g., People v. Wyne, 607 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (upholding father’s conviction for the separate crimes of custodial interference and criminal contempt
under the state penal code).
123. See Fontana v. Fontana, 426 So. 2d 351, 353 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting father’s claim in
a visitation enforcement case that “the [criminal] contempt proceeding could not be initiated by [mother]
and had to be initiated by the district attorney or the court on its own motion”).  All of the other cases
discussed in this Section involve an assumption that the complaining parent had standing to initiate an
action for either civil contempt or criminal contempt.  But see DOBBYN, supra note 108, at 218 (“[T]he
in an earlier visitation enforcement proceeding against the father who
subsequently filed for bankruptcy, because the contempt was criminal in
nature.
Although the characterization of a contempt proceeding and contempt
order as civil or criminal has important ramifications for the contemnor during
the contempt hearing and thereafter, ambiguity exists in many cases as to this
important matter.  Often, the underlying contempt statutes,  the parties’120
pleadings, and the courts’ orders all fail to clearly characterize contempt
proceedings as criminal or civil in nature.  The issue, then, is raised only after
the fact, when some differing consequence between the two is at stake.
According to one scholar in the field of injunctions, “[n]inety percent of the
malfunctions in the system of contempt result from confusion . . . between
these two types of contempt.”   The confusion is apparent in many custody121
enforcement cases.
One factor contributing to the blurred line between civil and criminal
contempt involves the absence of formal indicators in most criminal contempt
cases that the proceeding is “criminal” in nature.  The “criminal contempt”
discussed here is not a crime prosecutable by the state in criminal court.122
Rather, just like the civil contempt proceeding, a criminal contempt case is
usually initiated by a private party in the civil court where the initial
injunctive order was issued.  In the field of custody enforcement, the
complaining parent returns to the custody court to allege the contempt,
whether criminal or civil, of the other parent who failed to comply with an
initial custody order.123
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criminal contempt process is considered an action separate and distinct from the original action in which
the injunction was issued.  It is prosecuted, not by the [other private party], but by the judge himself, or an
officer of the court.”).
124. Songer v. State, 364 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ark. 1963) (rejecting father’s claim that the trial court
had improperly failed to apply the reasonable doubt standard required in criminal contempt cases).  See
generally Livingston, supra note 58, at 376 (“The [Supreme] Court emphatically rejected any attempt to
classify contempts based on their underlying purpose, noting that any given contempt serves both remedial
and punitive purposes to some extent.”) (citing Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988)).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
126. 502 S.E.2d 86 (S.C. 1998).
127. Id. at 88 (quoting the trial court order).
Another factor that contributes to ambiguity in characterizing contempt
orders involves the expansive judicial goals in many contempt cases.  The
distinction between civil and criminal contempt becomes blurry when a
contempt order is intended to serve both punitive (associated with criminal
contempt) and remedial (associated with civil contempt) purposes.  For
example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas highlighted the apparently
overlapping purposes of the contempt order in a visitation enforcement case,
stating:
No doubt the two purposes [served by civil and criminal contempt adjudications,
respectively] often merge as we think they do in this case.  It appears from the wording
of the [trial] court’s order that the [father] was punished because he disobeyed the court’s
mandate (that is, to preserve the dignity of the court) and also to insure cooperation of
the petitioner in the future (that is, to enforce the rights of [the mother]).124
A related source of ambiguity is the failure of trial judges to maintain the
bright doctrinal line drawn between the sanctions available for criminal and
civil contempt, respectively.  Since the characterization of a contempt order
depends primarily upon the sanctions imposed by the court,  this type of125
blurring is inherently confusing.  For example, the ambiguous contempt order
in the South Carolina case of Poston v. Poston  provided that the mother,126
who had violated prior orders that she have no contact with her children,
“shall be sentenced to 120 days incarceration but may purge herself of
contempt by strict compliance with [the no-contact orders].”   The mother127
appealed on the ground that the contempt adjudication was criminal in nature,
so that the trial court’s failure to apply the heightened standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt constituted reversible error.  Although the
intermediate appellate court in Poston accepted the mother’s position on this
issue, the state high court did not.  According to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, “[t]he contempt order is . . . a hybrid because the sanction has
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128. Id. at 91.
129. Id. at 92.  See also Ingebrethsen v. Ingebrethsen, 661 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(Wieand, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority’s characterization of contempt order as criminal
contempt, where mother was ordered to serve a fixed ninety-day jail sentence); Fatemi v. Fatemi, 537 A.2d
840, 844-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (characterizing contempt order with sanctions of a $25,000 fine and lis
pendens order against father’s home as civil contempt, even though the trial court had labeled the father’s
contempt as criminal).
130. 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[2][a], at 32-418.
131. 4 LITTLE, supra note 9, § 25.05[2], at 25-149.
characteristics of both civil and criminal contempt.”   Specifically, the128
definite period of the sentence suggested a criminal sanction imposed for a
punitive purpose, but the purge provision indicated a coercive purpose to be
achieved via civil contempt.  The Poston court remanded the case to the trial
court to “clarify its intent and issue an order setting forth a contempt sanction
that is either clearly criminal or clearly civil.”129
Thus, the dual systems of civil and criminal contempt, and the similarities
between the two types of judicial proceedings and orders, may lead to
ambiguity about the nature of the contempt order in cases where the parties’
pleadings and the courts’ orders do not clarify this issue.  This lack of clarity
complicates the enforcement of custody and visitation orders in many cases.
F.  Coercive Civil Contempt Remedies in Child Custody Cases
Based on the “civil” label used by the parties and the courts, the nature
of the sanctions imposed, and the explicit goals emphasized in judicial
opinions, the majority of contempt cases in the family law area appear to fall
into the civil contempt category.  Thus, “[a]lthough criminal contempt may be
appropriate in some custody matters, it is not as common as a civil contempt
proceeding.”   Furthermore, as between the two types of remedial sanctions130
available for civil contempt, coercive sanctions seem to be employed more
readily than compensatory sanctions in child custody enforcement cases.
Thus, “[a]s a general rule contempt proceedings in child custody and visitation
disputes are civil contempts and have a basically remedial focus.  They are
intended to bring about compliance with the court’s prior custody and
visitation directives for the benefit of the other party . . . .”131
The classic coercive contempt order, based on a finding that the
contemnor violated an earlier order of the court, imposes a serial fine or open-
ended jail sentence, which continues until the contemnor satisfies certain
conditions set out in the contempt order.  These conditions typically require
compliance with the terms of the initial court order, thus highlighting the
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(“sentenc[ing] [the father] to one year imprisonment for contempt of court, provided that he be allowed to
purge himself of contempt by the payment of [compensatory amounts] to [mother]”).  But see Thedieck v.
Thedieck, 470 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (“To the extent that the trial court’s order conditioned
[mother’s] avoidance of . . . incarceration upon payment of the attorney fees award, it was erroneous.”).
ultimate purpose of the contempt adjudication.  Often called a “purge
provision,” this type of coercive court order enables the contemnor to purge
himself or herself of contempt by satisfying the conditions established by the
court.  As to contempt orders that impose conditional jail sentences, courts
often state that the contemnor, by virtue of the purge provision, “hold[s] the
keys to his own jail cell.”   Familiar examples outside the custody area132
involve the imprisonment of a parent held in contempt for the failure to pay
child support, until the parent pays the amount due; or the imprisonment of a
trespasser until he or she removes a structure unlawfully placed on the land of
another.  The essential features of the coercive civil contempt remedy have
been summarized in the following manner:
Historically, the primary recourse of the equity court has been personal coercion of the
recalcitrant defendant through the use of the power to hold him in civil contempt until
he complies.  The essence of the civil contempt power is the indefinite cumulative
sanction which continues until the defendant has purged himself of contempt by obeying
the underlying order.  The most familiar of these sanctions are the per diem fine and the
continuing imprisonment of the disobedient individual, but other devices are available.133
In the custody context, this classic model of the coercive contempt order,
including the purge provision, has easy application to cases where one parent
unlawfully retains the physical custody of children at the time of the contempt
hearing, contrary to the terms of an established custody order.  For example,
the mother in the case of Mauro v. State  was held in contempt for her failure134
to comply with a modified custody order requiring her to deliver the children
in her physical custody to their father, the newly-named primary custodian.
The trial court’s contempt order “sentenced [the mother] to 30 days’
incarceration . . . [and] provided that [she] could ‘purge her contempt at any
time by immediately releasing the children to the [father].’”   Notably, the135
children were eventually delivered to the father only after the mother was
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137. 481 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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arrested with them still in her care.  The Mauro court held that the placement
of the children with their father, even when accomplished without the
voluntary cooperation of the mother, satisfied the purge provision and the
remedial goal of the contempt order.  The court ruled that the order must
therefore be vacated.
At the time of the contempt hearing in Mauro, the mother was in violation
of a custody order that apparently required a single act of compliance on her
part:  transfer of the children to their father.  The classic model of the
conditional contempt order, combining a fine or jail sentence with a purge
provision, was easily applied to this fact pattern.  This same type of coercive
contempt order does not, however, fit as neatly in another, more common
custody enforcement fact pattern.
Many parenting plan orders dealing with the residential aspect of custody
require recurring transfers of the children between their parents.  Often, one
parent petitions for judicial relief because the other parent unlawfully retained
physical custody of the children in the past, but by the time the injured parent
seeks judicial relief, the children are “where they should be” under the terms
of the parenting plan.  In these circumstances, the current imposition of a fine
or jail sentence cannot, as a practical matter, be used by the court to coerce the
compliant behavior that has already occurred.  The courts have dealt with this
puzzle in various ways, when confronted with requests to hold the formerly
noncompliant parent in contempt of court.136
Custody courts have sometimes ruled in these circumstances that no
coercive civil contempt remedy is available, and have relied exclusively upon
their criminal contempt authority.  For example, the Pennsylvania trial court
in Bruzzi v. Bruzzi  held the father in contempt for returning his child one137
week late to the custodial mother following a scheduled period of visitation.
The appellate court in Bruzzi characterized the contempt adjudication as
necessarily criminal, rather than civil, because no remedial or coercive
purpose could be served by the trial court’s order.  According to the appellate
court, “[father] could not be coerced into returning the children; he had
already done so.”   The Georgia Supreme Court identified the same138
limitation on coercive judicial authority in the visitation enforcement setting,
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141. 3 RUTKIN, supra note 4, § 32.11[2][a], at 32-417.  See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4346(a)
(2004) (listing imprisonment for up to six months or probation for that period of time, along with other
sanctions, in the custody and visitation enforcement statute).
142. 494 So. 2d 664 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
143. Id. at 665-66.  Notably, the court in Hudson also imposed a fixed criminal contempt sanction
of 120 hours in jail.  Id. at 665.
144. Id. at 667 (quoting the trial court order).
as follows:  “With respect to short periods of visitation the most practical
means of enforcement is by use of criminal contempt as the visitation time
period has usually expired before the court can act.”139
Other courts have approached the issue of remedies in this common fact
pattern with greater flexibility, by focusing on the possibility of coercing
future compliance by the parent who violated residential custody and
visitation orders in the past.  In formulating a conditional contempt order with
this goal in mind, the courts have made adjustments to the “classic purge
model” discussed above and illustrated in the Mauro case.140
One alternative coercive model is the probationary contempt order, which
imposes sanctions for past violations of the initial custody decree, and
suspends the fine or jail sentence for so long as the parent remains in
compliance.  As described by Professor Rutkin, “[a]fter finding that the [initial
parenting plan] decree was violated, a court may . . . place the parent on
probation on the condition that future violations will not occur.”141
In the case of Hudson v. Hudson,  for example, the trial court cited the142
mother for civil contempt after she failed to comply with both the visitation
provision and a property provision in her divorce decree.  The trial court
imposed a sentence of jail every weekend until she complied with the
visitation and property orders, but suspended the sentence “to allow the
[mother] to comply with its orders.”   The contempt order in Hudson also143
provided that “[i]n the event the Court is not satisfied that the [mother]
appreciates the significance of the civil contempt citations, the [c]ourt reserves
the right to execute said sentence.”   Most likely, the trial court anticipated144
that no future determination about the mother’s “appreciat[ion of] the
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could be implemented in the future.  Id. at 91-92.
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147. Id. at 678.
148. Id.  But see In re Marriage of Eilers, 526 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (reversing the
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the record suggests the imposition of actual jail time may be the only means by which [mother] will learn
how imperative it is she comply with court orders”).
significance of the civil contempt citations” would ever be made, and that the
threat of jail would coerce future compliance.  Furthermore, noncompliance
in the future would provide the basis for a negative determination about the
mother’s level of appreciation, resulting in her incarceration under the terms
of the contempt order.145
The threat of imprisonment under this type of probationary order
apparently had the desired coercive effect in the case of In re Marriage of
Herrera.   In Herrera, after finding that the mother had violated its visitation146
orders in the past, the trial court imposed a fifteen day jail term, and
“[f]ourteen days of the sentence were suspended on the condition that the
mother comply with the visitation orders.”   Thereafter, “the trial court held147
a review hearing on the contempt citation.  It found the mother in compliance
with the visitation orders, . . . and dismissed the contempt citation.”148
Under probationary contempt orders, illustrated in the Hudson and
Herrera cases, the contemnor can avoid the contempt sanction of a fine or
imprisonment by satisfying conditions of probation, which generally require
the parent’s current (post-contempt) compliance with the initial custody
decree.  This remedial model varies in significant ways from the classic
conditional contempt order, which involves the current implementation of a
fine or jail sentence until the contemnor acts to remedy past violations of the
initial court order.  The probationary coercive order is an alternative remedy
applicable when the contemnor is guilty of past violations, but has moved into
compliance at the time of the contempt hearing, and still has future obligations
under the initial custody order.  These circumstances characterize many
custody and visitation enforcement cases.
Another variation on the classic contempt model, developed for
application in these same circumstances, looks to the intention of the
contemnor regarding future compliance.  Under this “good faith model,” the
sanction of a fine or imprisonment for past violations of the custody order is
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currently implemented (as in the classic model).  The condition imposed on
the contemnor that enables him or her to purge the contempt, however, is the
demonstration of a good faith intention to comply in the future with the
custody order.  For example, a Nevada statute dealing with the enforcement
of make-up visitation orders provides that “[a] custodial parent imprisoned for
contempt . . . must be released from jail if the court has reasonable cause to
believe that he will comply with the [visitation] order.”   The “future intent”149
condition here replaces the traditional conduct requirement which cannot, as
a practical matter, be imposed in these circumstances.  That is, given the
nature of the parent’s future obligations regarding custody, performance
cannot take place while the parent is in jail.150
Custody enforcement courts have demonstrated flexibility in shaping
contempt orders that are designed to bring parents into compliance with the
terms of their post-divorce parenting plans.  Both the probationary contempt
order and the coercive contempt order with a condition relating to the future
intentions of the contemnor are variations on the classic coercive contempt
model.  They have been designed by the courts to respond to the special
features of the underlying judicial orders in custody enforcement cases, which
often involve recurring obligations by both parents.
G.  Compensatory Civil Contempt Remedies in Child Custody Cases
Although less common than the coercive function discussed above,
custody enforcement courts may also issue civil contempt orders for the
purpose of compensating a parent who was injured by the other’s past
violation of a custody order.  Professor James Fischer captured this dual
remedial function in describing general civil contempt doctrines, as follows:
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151. FISCHER, supra note 29, § 312, at 723.
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an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L. FORUM 971, 971.  See generally Annotation, Right of Injured Party to Award
of Compensatory Damages or Fine in Comtempt Proceedings, 85 A.L.R.3d 895 (1978) (collecting cases
outside the field of child custody and visitation).  The compensatory fine must be distinguished from the
fine payable to the court in criminal contempt cases.  See DOBBS, supra note 24, § 2.8(3), at 140 (“A
compensatory fine is a determinate amount and as such bears one of the marks of a criminal sanction.  On
the other hand, if it is proportioned to the loss suffered and payable to the party aggrieved, its remedial
function seems predominant . . . .”).
153. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.400(6)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.160(2)(b)(ii) (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2A-9(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).  Provisions
in other state custody enforcement statutes provide for fines payable to the injured parent as a noncontempt
remedy.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728(b)(3) (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.3(d) (West 2000).
Additional enforcement devices in custody and visitation statutes, such as provisions for make-up time with
children, also have a compensatory purpose.  See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
154. See ELROD, supra note 51, § 15:7, at 15-24 n.4 (collecting compensatory contempt cases).
155. See Livingston, supra note 58, at 401-02; Rendleman, supra note 152, at 974.
156. Livingston, supra note 58, at 402.
“Civil contempt is identified by its remedial effect.  It can compel obedience
to a court order for the benefit of the complainant or compensate the
complainant for injuries resulting from noncompliance.  Thus, either a
coercive or a compensatory order may remedy civil contempt.”   Within this151
general framework, “[c]ompensatory contempt is a money award for the
plaintiff when the defendant has injured the plaintiff by violating an
injunction.”152
In the custody area, a number of state statutes expressly authorize this
type of compensatory award or fine payable to the injured parent, when the
other parent violates the terms of a court-ordered parenting plan.   The courts153
in custody enforcement cases have relied upon these special family law
statutes, or the general civil contempt law of the jurisdiction, in making
compensatory awards in child custody and visitation cases.154
Scholars in the field of remedies have highlighted an inherent difficulty
in awarding money as the remedy for breach of an equitable, coercive order
of the court.   In many cases, an injunctive order was entered in the first155
place because the individual rights protected by the order could not be easily
quantified or protected by a monetary award.  In the event of a subsequent
violation, then, “plaintiffs are faced with the prospect of quantifying the harm
that they suffer as a result of the defendant’s disobeying the order . . . [even
though] their injury is by definition difficult if not impossible to measure in
money terms.”156
This valuation dilemma has sometimes led to the conclusion that
compensatory contempt awards must be disallowed, because they introduce
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damages into an equitable relief setting.  Thus, “[s]ome courts have
questioned the remedial or compensatory fine, on the ground that it really
awards damages. . . .”   Elsewhere, the valuation dilemma has resulted in a157
limitation on the types of damages available for contempt.  Namely, “[i]t is
often stated that compensatory contempt is limited to ‘actual damages’
incurred by the injured party as a result of the contemnor’s violation of a court
order.”   Finally, the broadest approach to compensation in civil contempt158
cases allows reimbursement for actual monetary losses, and also authorizes
the courts to undertake the more difficult task of valuing and compensating the
injured party’s nonmonetary losses.159
In the custody area, the complaining parent’s losses typically fall into two
discrete categories:  out of pocket expenses incurred as a result of the other
parent’s violation of the custody order, and the loss of certain aspects of
custody as a result of the same violation.  The first category of losses is not
likely to raise valuation problems.  For example, parents have been reimbursed
under the theory of compensatory contempt for expenses relating to the
change in travel plans necessitated by the other parent’s failure to make
children available for scheduled travel,  lost wages representing the parent’s160
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164. 720 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
165. Id. at 322.
166. See also Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711, 714, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (stating that
“[e]ven if the . . . fine did not compensate father for litigation expenses, it served to compensate him for
mother’s violation of his court-mandated rights to custody of his children,” in affirming award between
never-married parents) (emphasis added)).
time required to litigate the contempt,  attorney fees,  and other out of161 162
pocket expenses.163
The second category of losses, involving lost time with children, is more
difficult to articulate and quantify in individual cases.  These losses represent
the family-related interests that the initial custody order sought to protect.  The
Florida court in the case of LaRoche v. Briggs,  for example, recognized and164
compensated a father’s nonmonetary loss when the mother unlawfully retained
the physical custody of their daughter for a period of sixty-one days prior to
the contempt hearing.  The trial court in LaRoche had imposed a fine of one
hundred dollars per day payable to the father for each of the sixty-one days.
The appellate court reduced this fine by the amount of one hundred dollars for
each day on which the initial custody order had authorized visitation by the
mother, and otherwise affirmed the contempt order.   Clearly, the appellate165
court agreed with the trial court that the father, who served as primary
residential parent under the initial custody order, had suffered a loss each day
without his child, and assigned a value of one hundred dollars to that loss.
The LaRoche court did not, however, detail the nature of the loss so
identified and compensated.  Presumably, the daily fine in LaRoche reflected
the court’s attempt to quantify the qualitative experience of spending time
with one’s children.   In other custody enforcement cases, judges have166
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identified “emotional damages”  and “inconvenience and frustration”  as167 168
additional non-quantitative losses compensable by monetary awards.
There is, however, no uniform rule among the states about the
allowability of compensation for these types of nonmonetary losses in custody
and visitation cases.  The Missouri Court of Appeals in Levis v. Markee, for
example, disallowed a fine for civil contempt imposed upon the mother who
had “deprived father of two days visitation with [his son].”   According to169
the Levis court, “an outright fine, unrelated to actual damages, is not
appropriate for civil contempt because it is not designed to cure but is
intended to punish.”   Thus, the court failed to recognize the father’s lost170
time with his son as a compensable loss.  The lack of uniformity on this issue
in child custody enforcement cases, illustrated by a comparison of the
LaRoche and Levis cases, reflects the variation in general state contempt
doctrines regarding compensation for nonmonetary losses in civil contempt
proceedings.171
In the custody enforcement context, where the contemnor who violated
obligations in the past still owes continuing obligations in the future under the
terms of an initial custody order, compensatory payments for past violations
may be an inadequate remedy.  In the LaRoche case, for example, the Florida
court combined the fixed compensatory fine of $100 per day for the mother’s
past violations, described above, with a coercive contempt order that
addressed the need for her future compliance.  Specifically, the LaRoche court
imposed a conditional fine of $100 for each day following the contempt
hearing that the mother retained custody of her child contrary to the residential
custody schedule established in the initial custody order.172
Thus, the courts have been flexible in formulating civil contempt
remedies in custody and visitation enforcement cases.  This flexibility is
demonstrated by the combination of compensatory and coercive contempt
sanctions in the LaRoche case, and the judicial variations on the classic “purge
model” of the coercive contempt remedy discussed in the last Section.  These
remedies reflect the special nature of enforceable parenting plan orders.  Many
custody and visitation orders regulate the conduct of parents regarding
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essential family matters over a period of many years, in order to protect
parent-child relationships in the nonintact family.  The complex nature of
these orders and the importance of the interests they protect create the need
for flexible remedies when parents violate the terms of post-divorce custody
and visitation orders.
SUMMARY
Family law statutes in every state govern the child-related issues that arise
at the time of divorce.  As a general rule, these statutes require the divorce
courts to enter coercive orders that will govern the residential and
decisionmaking aspects of post-divorce parent-child relationships.  The laws
in many states also set out the remedies, including civil and criminal
contempt, available to enforce court-ordered parenting plans in the event of
parental noncompliance.  This area of statutory regulation, which touches the
lives of millions of families every year, is in many ways sui generis.  At the
same time, the coercive nature of the court-ordered terms of post-divorce
parenting plans, and the availability of enforcement by civil or criminal
contempt remedies, place custody and visitation orders in a larger doctrinal
context.  This Article analyzed child custody and visitation laws against this
backdrop of the law of injunctions and the law of contempt.
The family law system assigns priority to the maintenance of established
relationships between children and both of their parents following the parents’
divorce.  This priority leads to certain variations from the general model of
injunctive remedies in many child custody cases.  For example, divorce courts
formulate the initial coercive parenting orders, which become immediately
enforceable by contempt remedies upon violation by one parent, without
making any determination of prior wrongdoing by either parent.  Furthermore,
the courts routinely enter coercive orders addressing the residential and
decisionmaking aspects of post-divorce parenting, even though the anticipated
period of judicial regulation is lengthy (until the children’s ages of majority),
and despite evidence of likely compliance problems.  Finally, in the event of
parental noncompliance, judicial enforcement via contempt remedies may
involve the entry of orders that vary significantly from the classic contempt
model, especially when the contempt remedy is civil rather than criminal in
nature.
Parenting plan orders typically set out specific responsibilities for both
parents, to be performed over a period of years until the children become
adults.  The nature of these orders, involving recurring patterns of family
behavior, and the importance of the interests that they seek to protect have
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shaped many of the family law doctrines discussed in this Article.  These
doctrines have molded the general law of injunctions to fit a unique legal
context, the creation and enforcement of post-divorce custody orders.
